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Introduction
Central America remains on the margins of international political life, but developments related to crime, violence and insecurity attract growing interest. It has become common to state that levels of violence in the region are as high as, or even higher than at the times of state terror, insurgent action and war of the 1970s and 1980s. The present paper questions this notion of regional vulnerability, indicating national differences as well as a variety of violent (and non-violent) realities.
This paper is part of an ongoing research project on 'Public Spaces and Violence in Central
America', carried out together with Sebastian Huhn and Peter Peetz. The research project 6
Oettler: Discourses on Violence in Costa Rica, El Salvador and Nicaragua examines the origins, development, and institutionalization of contemporary discourses on violence in Centralamerica. There is a wealth of theoretical writing behind our approach.
First of all, it is based on the theoretical claims of Critical Discourse Analysis that is concerned with the 'social construction of reality' (Berger/Luckmann 1966) . Critical Discourse Analysis examines how discourses (re)produce and challenge power structures and vice versa. We presume, thus, that the high level of Central American Criminal violence has become a fact, which is such, because it is commonly believed (for more details on our approach, see our previous GIGA Working Paper No. 34, Huhn/Oettler/Peetz 2006b). Moreover, we hypothesize that the notion of exploding crime is part of a dominant ideologicaldiscursive formation (Fairclough 1995) and not necessarily linked to 'real' threat levels or life-world experience.
This paper is concerned with discursive nodes and patterns of attention associated with contemporary violence in Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Nicaragua -three cases chosen for a variety of forms and contexts. We presume that the discourse on violence differs from country to country, with varying threat levels and objects of fear. The paper explores how differentpowerful or less powerful -publics contribute to the Central American 'talk of crime ' (Caldeira 2000) . It focuses on the interconnectedness of hegemonic discourses and counterdiscourses across media, public politics, academic spheres and the lifeworld. Empirically, the paper is based on newspapers, academic papers, publications and programs of political parties. 1 Moreover, it analyizes approximately 90 semi-structured qualitative interviews gathered in November and December, 2006, together with Sebastian Huhn and Peter Peetz.
The interviewees represent a wide range of professions and social classes. As discussed below, social affiliation channels the perception of crime, violence, and (in)security. In examining discursive fragments circulating within political publics, media, and academic spheres, it has become clear that there is an ongoing struggle on the social classification of perpetrators and those to be protected in Central America.
The paper is organized as follows. As 'discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially shaped' (Fairclough/Wodack 1997: 258) , chapter 2 provides a brief historical overview of the evolution of political forces since the beginning of the 20 th century. The third chapter exposes national discourses on contemporary violence in Costa Rica, El Salvador and Nicaragua, dealing with two basic questions: What are the main issues visible in public debates on violence, crime and insecurity? And: Where are discourses circulating? Chapter 4 explores the landscape of discursive arenas from a comparative perspective, focusing on the cipher of youth gangs, the perception of grand corruption, and gendered debates. The conclusion reflects on the social orders emanating from current discursive battles.
1
A previous GIGA Working Paper (No. 33) on the macro-structure of print media discourse on violence has been pre-published in 2006 (Huhn/Oettler/Peetz 2006a) . The research data we gathered include 227 essays written by pupils from nine public, private and rural schools and a theatre project (Huhn/Oettler/Peetz 2007).
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Background: Political Spaces in Costa Rica, El Salvador and Nicaragua
Central America encompasses a past that includes a common history as well as a variety of national and local histories. Political turmoil and armed confrontation flourished throughout the second half of the 20 th century, with Costa Rica being the sole exception. 2 Democracy came by civil war (Costa Rica, 1948) , by insurrection (Nicaragua I, 1979) , by election (Nicaragua II, 1990) , by military directive (El Salvador I, 1982) and by peace negotiation (El Salvador II, 1992) .
Following the annulment of presidential election results in March, 1948 , Costa Rica experienced a short civil war, bringing José Figueres into power. Since then, the political system has displayed high stability, based on a party system that has been effectively dominated by two parties, the Partido Liberación Nacional (PLN) and the Partido Unidad Social Cristiana (PUSC).
The commitment to democracy, the abolishment of the army and the 'Bismarckian character of the Costa Rican state' (Davis/Aguilar/Speer 1999: 43) became core features of national identity. In contrast to other Central American countries, the non-communist political society was embedded into an institutional setting characterized by a high level of political freedom.
While political interests were mainly channeled through the party system, a variety of labor unions, religious groups and, later, ambientalist and feminist groups emerged. The history of social movements is characterized by the growing strength of solidarity associations and cooperatives (Davis/Aguilar/Speer 1999:44) -and by subsequent waves of strikes, sometimes violent. Press freedom was mainly limited by news filters such as concentrated ownership (Huhn/Oettler/Peetz 2006a , for the concept of news filters see Herman/Chomsky 1988) . If the second half of the 20 th century was characterized by the consolidation of democracy and 'organized civil society' 3 , the turn of the millenium witnessed a significant change. The 'transition to neoliberalism' (Booth 2000: 101) of the late 1980s implied the replacement of the social democratic model by structural adjustment and cut-backs in social security, education and health. While political decision making was dominated by decree, voters faced the increasing 'sameness of the PLN and PUSC' (Booth 2000: 96) . As a result of the 2006 elections, the bipartisan model came to an end. Surprisingly, the Partido Acción Ciudadana (PAC), founded in 2000 by Ottón Solís, received 38.9% of the vote, and the PUSC suffered a devastating defeat, winning only 3.5% of the vote. The 'newcomer's' appeal to the electorate was successful, because he presented PAC as a force that was opposing free-trade and corruption. At this time, the political system was shattered by corruption affairs, with three ex-presidents and highranking officials from the most important public institutions being involved (Huhn 2006) . It is 2 While most explanations of Costa Rican exceptionalism refer to ethnic homegeneity and the egalititarian distribution of land (Woodward 1999: 213-14) , John A. Booth points at the 'combination of increasingly powerful social forces, driven by socioeconomic diversity and political discord that forced the adaption of democratic institutions at mid twentieth century' (Booth 2000: 89) .
3
'Civil society' has become a catch-all category, sometimes being defined as 'all non-state actors and institutions' (see Cohen/Arato 1992, Chapter 1). In this paper, the term organized civil society refers to organizations and (parts of) state institutions as opposed to the political right. The term non-progressive civil society, on the other hand, refers to non-state actors with strong ties to right-wing political parties and/or the government. Finally, we use the term civil society to indicate the non-state specter of society, whether organized or not. (Studemeister 2001 , Zinecker 2004 ). There have been positive achievements such as the demobilisation of military and guerilla forces, the subordination of the military to civilian authorities, and, most notably, the end of war. Nevertheless, the peace settlemet was 'undermined by halfhearted compliance' (Karl 1995: 75) , and there 'have been notorious deficiencies' (Cañas/Dada 1999: 73) .
It is important to note, however, that the 'political 'space' expanded prior to the formal accord' (Arnson 2001: 448; see also Foley 1996) . The restoration of democratic rule in the 1980s was an 'elite settlement' (Higley/Gunther 1992), expressing the political project of 'selfmodernized' sectors of the Salvadorean oligarchy (Zinecker 2004: 25) . However, the commitment to democratic procedures coincided with counterinsurgency ideologies and repressive means. In the face of systematic human rights violations, organized civil society grew throughout the 1980s. Most of the human rights organizations, academic institutions, trade unions and religious groups, which were to constitute the core of organized civil society, were linked to transnational social movements. According to Karl (1995: 82) (Zinecker 2004: 32-38) .
In contrast to El Salvador, popular uprising and guerilla warfare were successful in Nicaragua. By the end of the nineteenth century, the idea of building a transisthmian canal increased U.S. attention to the region. The following decades were marked by long periods of U.S. military occupation (1909-1919, 1912-1925, 1926-1933) and guerilla uprising headed by Augusto César Sandino. In the early 1930s, U.S. troops withdrew and gave way to the regime of the Somoza dynasty that was to rule the country for almost 50 years. As mentioned above, democracy came by insurrection. After the revolutionary triumph in July 1979, the Sandinistas encouraged a mixed economy and carried out national crusades against illiteracy and disease. It is important to recognize that the 'first half decade of Sandinista rule [...] featured experimentation, innovation, and some significant success in the area of politics' (Walker 2000: 74) . Espousing an ideological mélange or 'sincretismo politico' (Cardenal 2004: 540) [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] ) saw important political achievements (constitutional process, elections), this period was shaped by the contra war and the steady decline of both, the economy and social programs. The gains in participatory democracy were reversed (Figueroa Ibarra 1993 : 68-78, Walker 2000 : 76-77, Prevost 1997 . Soon after the electoral defeat of 1990, the FSLN experienced internal frictions 5 , and organized Sandinista civil society imploded. The Sandinista trade unions were engaged in the battle against structural adjustment and privatizations (Close 2005: 130) , and the Community Movement faced the effects of both, political polarization and cutbacks in social service programs such as the children´s community centers run by the Community movement (Polakoff/La Ramée 1997 (Vilas 1996: 488) .
In the meantime, Costa Rican political culture has been more and more 'Central Americanized' (Seligson 2002: 162) .
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As Vilas pointed out, this kinship network reproduced itself in varying circumstances and 'subsequently permitted some elements in the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie to resist Somoza´s competencia desleal, to transfer capital abroad, to ingraciate themselves in the Sandinista regime and participate there in high level policymaking positions, as well to join the anti-Sandinista UNO government' (Vilas 1992: 325) . It is important to note that the current meaning of maras has been achieved through a complex, contradictory public process. Within a few years after the war, public concern about delinquency and 'low intensity peace' (Ribera 1997: 128) The article 'From Exodus to Exitus', written by Heidrun Zinecker, serves as an example of the way in which the maras are constructed as the core discursive object: 'Although the maras are not responsible for the vast majority of violence, in the following they will be presented as an exemplary violent actor, because they are currently the most relevant collective violent actor, because they experience significant metamorphosis that should be taken into account, and because the country´s whole policy of public security is targeting them'. (Zinecker 2007:5) Obviously, the maras evolved as the most prominent perpetrator to be targeted by Salvadorean security forces. Since the mano dura ('iron fist') was introduced in 2003, right-wing politicians have been particularly concerned with anti-gang policies. But how do we know that maras are the most relevant collective violent actor? The argument seems to be accepted, even though it is not a matter of fact (Huhn/Oettler 2006 , Huhn/Oettler/Peetz 2006b . Thus, it is important to note that the mara paradigm has amounted to a generally accepted argument, operating as a self-fulfilling prophecy.
campaign started. During the first foro presidencial, a media event held in November 2003, Saca was asked: 'Tony, why should the Salvadorans vote for Tony Saca?'. Interestingly, the ARENA candidate referred to honesty ('manos limpios'), liberty (expression, economy, religion), dialogue, and foreign investment -but he did not mention public security or anti-gang policies. Later, in the run-up to the elections, ARENA disseminated a manifesto, titled 'País Seguro. Plan de Gobierno 2004 -2009 In this document, the 'iron-fist' against youth gangs is portrayed as the most important emergency measure to be taken. 10 By constructing, or recycling, a particular representation of public insecurity, clustered around the vivid image of monstrous youth gangs, ARENA was restricting other accounts.
However, it is important to note that differing versions of violent realities were generated within a networked and hierarchized public realm. Far from producing well-balanced representations of violence, the discourses on violence were, in Foucault´s words, 'interlocking, hierarchized, and all highly articulated around a cluster of power relations' ( In this document, a short section on 'other relevant offenses' opens with robbery and bodily injury and ends with traffic accidents. In between, there is a paragraph dealing with violence against women and children with a text box beneath referring to robbery and bodily injury.
This example shows how the debate on violence that is mandated by a definition of violence as fatal youth violence deflects public attention away from other issues such as genderbased violence. These issues are not completely silenced, but rather treated in discursive niches. A recent study, for instance, pointed out that Salvadoran newspapers 'prioritize and 9
The manifesto is a system of statements, through which a multi-faceted version of the Salvadoran reality is generated. In sum, the 'Plan de Gobierno' consists of 16 'areas of action' and 10 'presidential programs', each of them subdivided into a number of political measures and objectives. The first 'area of action' is citizen security, defined as a precondition for investment and competitive capability. The text concerning public security, composed of an introductory part and a list of 20 'sub-areas', focuses on preventive, integral and legal measures. As described above, the 2004 electoral campaign was a center from which the discourse on organized and monstrous youth violence emanated. However, the mano dura was not the only feature of the electoral process. The media and ARENA stoke the fear of communism, trying to establish a relationship between the FMLN and international terrorism. Moreover, the media highlighted the U.S. administration's preoccupation with leftist governments, adumbrating the possibility of deportations and dry-up of remittances, the financial pipeline that keeps the Salvadoran economy still running. The mano dura, thus, began to form an integral part of ARENA´s rhetoric repertoire, but not the only one. 13 In the Salvadoran case, the entrepreneurial sector is decisive for both, political agenda-setting and policy formulation. While ANEP is participating in institutions such as the National Commission on Citizen Security and Social Peace, the right-wing think tank FUSADES has enforced a specific understanding of what is threatening to investors. FUSADES, far from restricting its debate to 'iron fist' policies, proposes a catalog of measures, including no-arms programs, law enforcement, prevention, rehabilitation, and institution building (Pleitez Chávez 2006). We presume, thus, that the obsession with youth gangs will fade, giving way to a more sophisticated concept of the enemy to be targeted and the measures to be applied.
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All citations in italics were translated by the author. The platform is subdivided into four sections: (1) Restoring democratic rule, (2) economy and development, (3) the social sector, and (4) peace and security. Herty Lewites, the presidential candidate who died before the elections, proposed an integral policy of public security, based on both, the rule of law and preventive/reintegrative measures. María Sorayda Chavarría (PAC): 'There is much violence against women, but the truth is that women themselves generate machismo and we make that our own sons become machistas. The solution is, above all, love, the love of god. The bible says that the woman has to be subordinate to the man and that the man has the responsibility to love his woman. Being like this, all will be excellently functioning. ' (La Boletina 2006: 28-29 , own translation). children are in the streets, the parents are pissed, the mothers engage in prostitution, the men in drinking holes, billiard bars or robbing.
As described below, the Nicaraguan 'talk of crime' as being performed by women from poor neighborhoods or by women assisting female victims of violence, tends to be centered around machismo and alcohol.
Costa Rica: Crime and Moral Decline
In contrast to El Salvador and Nicaragua, political parties and decision-making bodies in Costa Rica tend to highlight the very perception of insecurity as a major problem. However, it appears that the twofold problem of increasing crime/fear was irrelevant to the electoral process in 2006. While the electoral platforms of both PAC and PLN included the issue of insecurity, promising an 'integral-preventive vision' (PAC), the strengthening of the police, and the recovery of values and norms, media debates focused on free-trade, privatization, the social system, and, most notably, the personality of the presidential candidates. In Costa Rica, the increase in crime is not perceived as being explosive in nature, but rather linked to a steady socio-ecomomic decline since the mid-1980s. It is important to note that a perceived or real dramatic increase in robberies emerged as a thematic node associated with other leitmotivs such as drug consumption and moral decline (see, for instance, Rico 2006: 17, 25-26) . In La Nación, the issue of 'ordinary violence' is not treated prominently, but intensely (Huhn/Oettler/Peetz 2006a). News coverage in La Nación reflects an ongoing concern that the country is facing a permanent decline linked to a deterioration of both the foundations of the social security system and the social fabric of society. By attributing crime to moral decline, La Nación as well as other important speakers establishes an argument that leads to the stigmatization of the youth. Consider, for example, Ottón Solís's Convocatoria a la Ciudadanía. In this document, the PAC associates crime and insecurity with social exclusion, loss of solidarity, impunity and corruption, the transnationalization of organized crime, and 'domestic violence, especially violence against women' (PAC 2006: 43-44) . The chapter on insecurity culminates in a statement on rehabilitation measures, with infractores (lawbreakers), 'children and adolescents with criminal behavior', 'youth gangs' ('pandillas juveniles'), and 'marginalized youth from rural and urban areas' being the focus groups. How does the diagnosis of crime symptoms translate into the definition of perpetrators to be reinserted into society? It is crucial to note that the Costa Rican 'talk of crime' is not a talk of youth gangs, but rather a talk of moral decline, with the (imagined) criminal behavior of adolescents serving as a vivid leitmotiv.
There is a question that tends to be raised, and that is: 'Is there a upper limit for this increase [of crime] to be still considered tolerable?' (Rico 2006: 22, translated by AO). As the reciprocal effects between poverty, the decline of the welfare state, the education system and the increase in crime are highlighted, the whole society is portrayed as being caught in a violent downward spiral. A Costa Rican nurse referred to a […] this has already become a cancer, this has already spread out a lot, there is insecurity everywhere, somewhere they remove ten wrongdoers and twenty appear, then they remove twenty and fifty appear, no, this is already out of control, no, no.
The notion of moral deterioration leads to another leitmotiv with broad explanatory power:
The 
Comparative Perspectives

Organized Youth Violence as Discursive Node
Representatives of the political establishment as well as members of international think tanks play a core role in the process through which the meaning of youth gangs (pandillas, maras) is progressively achieved. The life-threatening scenario of brutalized and hierarchized gang culture, however, evolves into something more fluid as we take into account other public realms. It is important to note that the cook identifies two groups of perpetrators, mareros and delinquents, and presumes them guilty for a variety of crimes. Although most interviewees also refer to other groups of perpetrators and other violent settings including, for instance, school massacres in the United States, the war in Iraq, suicide bombers, Colombian mass violence, insecurity in Somalia, it appears that the very notion of maras provides a strong argument.
In recent years, the concept of pandillas/maras has entered the political vocabulary. As political decision-makers, among them presidents, members of parliament, international consultants, began to turn their attention towards public security, youth gangs were increasingly labeled the perpetrator par excellence. It is crucial to underline, however, that the political intentions and socio-economic settings differed from country to country.
According to Rocha, various factors contributed to the discovery of Nicaraguan youth gangs In contrast to Nicaragua, the networked organized civil society in El Salvador was a counterweight to official agenda-setting rather than a policy multiplier. While ARENA is using 16 Since the late 1990s, a variety of institutions dealing with youth violence and/or 'young people at risk' have been established, with the National Secretary of Youth Affairs (Secretaría de la Juventud) and the Special Ombudsman´s Office for Children and Adolescents (Procuradoría Especial de la Niñez y la Adolescencia) being the most important.
the mara label as a meta-symbol for the evil, trying to establish the idea of close ties between maras, Jihadist terrorism and the FMLN, the latter circumnavigates the issue of youth violence, and rather focuses on power-relations and the socio-economic dimensions of development. Given the high degree of political polarization, the discursive power of organized civil society has been severely limited for a long time. Since anti-gang policies have been adopted, human rights organizations, churches, universities and non-organized professionals have criticized the state for both, violating human rights and exaggerating the problem of youth violence. Backed by international NGOs and intergovernmental organizations, 'organized civil society' aimed at establishing a counterweight to official statements. In general, critical views on repressive anti-gang rhetoric can be articulated (they are, actually, shared by key representatives of the Salvadoran government), but tend to be silenced by the mass media. Only recently, however, U.S. and Colombian 'success'-stories appear to have created renewed interest for entrepreneurial sectors to promote alternative anti-crime strategies, whether repressive or not. Recent interventions by FUSADES might signal a strategic shift from anti-gang measures to both, zero-tolerance and community policing.
In Costa Rica, the stigmatization of the youth has not yet been translated into policies. So far, the classification of the youth as the social group most vulnerable to crime and anti-social behavior rather corresponds to the widespread perception that Costa Rica is facing a moral decline. The latest PLN´s electoral platform includes a similar argument, stating that Costa Rica suffers a normative and identity crisis. Therefore, state policies should 'promote generation rescue, inspired by new principles and norms, creating the conditions for a renewed culture of social cohabitation that allows to revert the observed tendencies' (PLN 2005: §151, translated by AO). Why is a generation to be rescued? Or, in other words, why do strategies designed to prevent crime overlook adult criminals and violators, and solely refer to the imagined perpetrators of tomorrow? As described above, adolescents at risk tend to be the only group of perpetrators that is named.
What if grand corruption was the big story?
The UNODC's diagnosis of the state of Central American crime contains a short chapter on A Salvadoran snack bar owner, when asked if violence constitutes a topic of his daily conversations, said:
[…] eso para uno es como la comida del día, de que sempre hay algo de que se tiene que hablar sobre la violencia y de ahí viene toda la delincuencia, las maras, los delincuentes de traje de los del gobierno (El Salvador, 9 th December, 2006).
[…] this is, you see, it is like daily food, as there is always something you have to talk about violence, and all the violence results from there, the maras, the delinquents wearing the dress of those of the government.
It is crucial to note that the notion of corruption, as related to crime, violence and insecurity, When describing the 'subjective dimension', the authors summarize survey data with regard to victimization and individual protection measures. The National Commission for Citizen Security and Social Peace, thus, in no way addresses corruption as one of the core subjective dimensions, nor does it provide any argument to suggest a change of political culture.
While the corruption argument tends to be neglected in national debates on public security, it is disseminated by the media. In Central America, the macro-structure of press discourse on violence is characterized by ideological flexibility and commercial interests. In general, news coverage on violence differs from country to country, from year to year, and from In Nicaragua the issue of grand corruption, especially two scandals involving ex-president Alemán and high-ranking government officials, received high media interest in 2005. One year later, for some of our interviewees, the talk of crime was mainly a talk of grand corruption.
Gendered Publics and Violence
The talk of intentional crime, whether homicide, organized youth violence or grand corruption, is by no means the only talk of violence being performed in Central American publics.
Numerous writers have drawn attention to a pattern of violent phenomena, usually referred to as 'domestic violence', 'sexual violence' or 'intimate partner violence'. Each of these terms, however, has its own weaknesses. In this article, we use the term 'gender-based violence' to refer to a wide range of phenomena including child abuse and neglect, intimate partner violence (physical violence, sexual violence, emotional violence, financial depriva-
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The project 'Public Spaces and Violence in Central America' examined the online-versions of all front-pages of six leading Central American newspapers published in 2004, 2005 and 2006 . We saved and filed all frontpage stories dealing with 'ordinary violence', and we assigned them to the 'families' of topics: macro = Violence and Society; frontiers = Frontiers and Violence; drugs = Drugs and Crime; gender = Gender, Family and Crime; youth = Youth Violence; structure = Social Structure, Spatiality and Crime; judiciary = Judiciary and Violence; cases = Cases. As articles could be assigned to more than one 'topic family', the figure does not show the absolute frequency of press reporting, but rather the conjunctures of topic clusters, for more details on the data, see Huhn/Oettler/Peetz 2006a. (Carcedo Cabañas 2006 , Ellsberg 1997 , UCR/CIEM 2004 . While violence against women gets more and more visible in Central American publics, however, sexual abuse of boys or male suicidal behavior tend to be even more stigmatized and, therefore, invisible.
In general, public attention to gender-based violence is a sensitive barometer of power relations, with violence against women being at the center of most public debates. It is crucial to note that violence against women is a key aspect of hegemonic Central American masculinities that is performed in public (Lancaster 1992) . It is part of the social order, with its power relations, its economic imperatives, its privileges and its subordinations. In general, the Central American way of life is shaped by the binary code of machismo and marianismo, with the former being characterized by male domination and sexed social behavior and the latter being based on motherhood and self-abnegation.
In Central America, the issue of gender-based violence has a forum, albeit with varying relevance to the wider public. The feminist movement, international donor agencies and na- In recent years, the feminist movements in El Salvador and Nicaragua were subject to fierce discursive attacks. Right-wing governments as well as conservative women´s organizations blamed the leftist NGO sector and, especially, feminist groups, for social problems and moral decay (Kampwirth 2003) . On the other hand, feminist groups had to deal with the 'sexist ideology and practices' (Alvarez 2000, 8) The message is clear. The interviewee, supposedly assuming that the (male) interviewer would agree to his justification of gender-based violence, represents the machismo mentality that perpetuates the cycle of 'domestic' violence. It is important to note that violent behavior remains socially acceptable whithin 'macho-dominated' public spheres.
On the other side, what matters to many of our interviewees, are forms of gender-based violence as related to the 'policing of sex' (Foucault 2006: 517) . Many female and some male interviewees sketched out the contours of a violent reality, centered around gender-based violence. In contrast to the idea of youth gangs being the sword of Damocles hanging above daily life, many interviewees (for instance, female pupils, women from marginalized neighborhoods, psychologists, nurses and priests) identified intoxicated men as an omnipresent group of perpetrators. While male adolescents tend to be portrayed as gang members and criminals -whether brutal (El Salvador), amoral (Costa Rica) or nonviscous (Nicaragua) -male adults are often described as drunk thugs and wife beaters, constantly posing a sexual, verbal, physical and financial threat to women, children and female adolescents.
The awareness of this threat is closely associated with the perception of wide-spread impunity related to gender-based violence.
Our data suggest that the discourse on gender-based violence is polymorphous, with antagonistic public spheres being involved. Throughout Central America, feminist organizations tend to be accused of promoting lesbianism and, therefore, of degrading culture and morality. 20 The feminist movement´s counterpart is constituted by both, the conservative women´s movement and evangelicals producing and reproducing certain systems of social rules. Both groups are capable of making and disseminating public opinions. What we are observing in Central America, is the prevalence of conservative statements on how the problem of domes-
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In Nicaragua, as homosexuality is legally defined as a crime to be punished, this discursive motif is often found in public debates on gender-based violence.
tic violence should be treated. While evangelicals usually promote male and female asceticism, and thus an alternative masculinity, conservative women´s organizations as well as international NGOs and donor agencies campaign for the nuclear family model that had never been the predominant family structure in Central America (Dore 1997) . The promotion of the 'democratic family', consisting of the 'responsible husband', the 'independant wife' and two or more children evolves as the center of many prevention strategies (CEPREV 2005).
Conclusion
It has become common to state that criminal violence has superseded political violence in Central America. Based on the dictum that reality is socially constructed (Berger/Luckmann 1969) , we hypothesized that the high level of criminal violence may be understood as a social fact, which is such, because it is commonly believed. The seed of fear is, thus, not automatically nourished by 'real' violent incidents but rather by discursive events. Moreover, we presumed that the public discourse on violence is not a monolithic phenomenon, but rather a series of overlapping or contradictory discourses, emanating from a variety of hegemonic publics and 'counter-publics' (Fraser 1992) . Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First of all, the discourse on contemporary violence differs from one public sphere to another. The talk of crime is performed within ever-shifting intersectionalities of ethnicity, Secondly, public life in the three Central American countries analyzed in this study is shaped by the fear of crime, albeit with varying threat levels and different objects of fear. In general, we detected cross-sectoral discursive strings that characterize national discourses on contemporary violence in Costa Rica, El Salvador and Nicaragua. As described above, the perception of violence differs from one country to another, with important thematic nodes being linked to the political history of the countries. Our qualitative data indicate that national discourses on violence are intrinsically tied to national myths. The myth of Costa Rica being the nonviolent Latin American exception and the myth of Nicaragua being a se- tends to be still treated in discursive niches. Perceptions of insecurity are closely tied to a matrix of privilege and discrimination, with earnings, partnership, sexual orientation and residential background being important, albeit not determinative, factors affecting fear. The debate on grand corruption points to a discursive leitmotiv that is circulating within a variety of counter-publics, but rarely taken into account by politicians, international think tanks and the entrepreneurial sector. While many less powerful speakers identify grand corruption as one of the most devastating criminal behavior, powerful speakers tend to ignore the issue.
In sum, the perception of insecurity is multifaceted, with cross-sectoral and cross-border discursive strings as well as national and sub-national peculiarities. The complex nature of socially constructed violent realities, or the 'objectivity of the subjective' (Bourdieu 2005: 135) has to be taken into account when analyzing contemporary Central American societies.
